1. To assess and appraise existing and foreseeable threats to
our national security currently posed by the USSR; and to formulate
our objectives and aims as a guide in determining measures required
to counter such threats.
2. The will and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue
policies which threaten the security of the United States constitute
the greatest single danger to the U.S. within the foreseeable
future.
3. Communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly demonstrate
that the ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the
domination of the world. Soviet leaders hold that the Soviet communist
party is the militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its
rise to political power, and that the USSR, base of the world
communist movement, will not be safe until the non-communist nations
have been so reduced in strength and numbers that communist influence
is dominant throughout the world. The immediate goal of top priority
since the recent war has been the political conquest of western
Europe. The resistance of the United States is recognized by the
USSR as a major obstacle to the attainment of these goals.
4. The Soviet leaders appear to be pursuing these aims by:
a. Endeavoring to insert Soviet-controlled groups into positions
of power and influence everywhere, seizing every opportunity presented
by weakness and instability in other states and exploiting to
the utmost the techniques of infiltration and propaganda, as well
as the coercive power of preponderant Soviet military strength.
b. Waging political, economic and psychological warfare against
all elements resistant to communist purposes, and in particular
attempting to prevent or retard the recovery of and cooperation
among western European countries.
c. Building up as rapidly as possible the war potential of the
Soviet orbit in anticipation of war, which in communist thinking
is inevitable.
Both the immediate purposes and the ultimate objectives of the
Soviet leaders are inimical to the security of the United States
and will continue to be so indefinitely.
5. The present Soviet ability to threaten U.S security by measures
short <................>
a. The complete and effective centralization of power throughout
the USSR and the international communist movement.
b. The persuasive appeal of a pseudo-scientific ideology promising
panaceas and brought to other peoples by the intensive efforts
of a modern totalitarian propaganda machine.
c. The highly effective techniques of subversion, infiltration
and capture of political power, worked out through a half a century
of study and experiment.
d. The power to use the military might of Russia. and of other
countries already captured, for purposes of intimidation or, where
necessary, military action.
e. The relatively high degree of political and social instability
prevailing at this time in other countries, particularly in the
European countries affected by the recent war and in the colonial
or backward areas on which these European areas are dependent
for markets and raw materials.
f. The ability to exploit the margin of tolerance accorded the
communists and their dupes in democratic countries by virtue of
the reluctance of such countries to restrict democratic freedoms
merely in order to inhibit the activities of a single faction
and by the failure of those countries to expose the fallacies
and evils of communism.
6. It is impossible to calculate with any degree of precision
the dimensions of the threat to U.S. security presented by these
Soviet measures short of war. The success of these measures depends
on a wide variety of currently unpredictable factors, including
the degree of resistance encountered elsewhere, the effectiveness
of U.S. policy, the development of relationships within the Soviet
structure of power, etc. Had the United States not taken vigorous
measures during the past two years to stiffen the resistance of
western European and Mediterranean countries to communist pressures,
most of western Europe would today have been politically captured
by the communist movement. Today, barring some radical alteration
of the underlying situation which would give new possibilities
to the communists, the communists appear to have little chance
of effecting at this juncture the political conquest of any countries
west of the Luebeck-Trieste line. The unsuccessful outcome of
this political offensive has in turn created serious problems
for them behind the iron curtain, and their policies are today
probably motivated in large measure by defensive considerations.
However, it cannot be assumed that Soviet capabilities for subversion
and political aggression will decrease in the next decade, and
they may become even more dangerous than at present.
7. In present circumstances the capabilities of the USSR to threaten
U.S. security by the use of armed forces are dangerous and immediate:
a. The USSR, while not capable of sustained and decisive direct
military attack against U.S. territory or the Western Hemisphere,
is capable of serious submarine warfare and of a limited number
of one-way bomber sorties.
b. Present intelligence estimates attribute to Soviet armed forces
the capability of over-running in about six months all of Continental
Europe and the Near East as far as Cairo, while simultaneously
occupying important continental points in the Far East. Meanwhile,
Great Britain could be subjected to severe air and missile bombardment.
c. Russian seizure of these areas would ultimately enhance the
Soviet war potential, if sufficient time were allowed and Soviet
leaders were able to consolidate Russian control and to integrate
Europe into the Soviet system. This would permit an eventual concentration
of hostile power which would pose an unacceptable threat to the
security of the United States.
8. However, rapid military expansion over Eurasia would tax Soviet
logistic facilities and impose a serious strain on Russian economy.
If at the same time the USSR were engaged in war with the United
States, Soviet capabilities might well, in face of the strategic
offensives of the United States, prove unequal to the task of
holding the territories seized by the Soviet forces. If the United
States were to exploit the potentialities of psychological warfare
and subversive activity within the Soviet orbit, the USSR would
be faced with increased disaffection, discontent, and underground
opposition within the area under Soviet control.
9. Present estimates indicate that the current Soviet capabilities
mentioned in 7a above will progressively increase and that by
no later than 1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious
air attacks against the United States with atomic, biological
and chemical weapons, of more extensive submarine operations (including
the launching of short-range guided missiles), and of airborne
operations to seize advance bases. However, the USSR could not,
even then, successfully undertake an invasion of the United States
as long as effective U.S. military forces remained in being. Soviet
capabilities for overrunning western Europe and the Near East
and for occupying parts of the Far East will probably still exist
by 1958.
10. The Soviet capabilities and the increases thereto set forth
in this paper would result in a relative increase in Soviet capabilities
vis-à-vis the United States and the Western democracies
unless offset by factors such as the following:
a. The success of ERP.
b. The development of Western Union and its support by the United
States.
c. The increased effectiveness of the military establishments
of the United States, Great Britain, and other friendly nations.
d. The development of internal dissension within the USSR and
disagreements among the USSR and orbit nations.
11. The USSR has already engaged the United States in a struggle
for power. While it cannot be predicted with certainty whether,
or when, the present political warfare will involve armed conflict,
nevertheless there exists a continuing danger of war at any time.
a. While the possibility of planned Soviet armed actions which
would involve this country cannot be ruled out, a careful weighing
of the various factors points to the probability that the Soviet
Government is not now planning any deliberate armed action calculated
to involve the United States and is still seeking to achieve its
aims primarily by political means, accompanied by military intimidation.
b. War might grow out of incidents between forces in direct contact.
c. War might rise through miscalculation, through failure of either
side to estimate accurately how far the other can be pushed. There
is the possibility that the USSR will be tempted to take armed
action under a miscalculation of the determination and willingness
of the United States to resort to force in order to prevent the
development of a threat intolerable to U.S. security.
12. In addition to the risk of war, a danger equally to be guarded
against is the possibility that Soviet political warfare might
seriously weaken the relative position of the United States, enhance
Soviet strength and either lead to our ultimate defeat short of
war, or force us into war under dangerously unfavorable conditions.
Such a result would be facilitated by vacillation, appeasement
or isolationist concepts in our foreign policy, leading to loss
of our allies and influence; by internal disunity or subversion;
by economic instability in the form of depression or inflation;
or by either excessive or inadequate armament and foreign aid
expenditures.
13. To counter threats to our national security and to create
conditions conducive to a positive and in the long term mutually
beneficial relationship between the Russian people and our own,
it is essential that this government formulate general objectives
which are capable of sustained pursuit both in time of peace and
in the event of war. From the general objectives flow certain
specific aims which we seek to accomplish by methods short of
war, as well as certain other aims which we seek to accomplish
in the event of war.
14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within
the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable
power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system.
15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which
the USSR is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening
the relative world position of the United States and disrupting
its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient
resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist
countries.
16. The risk of war with the USSR is sufficient to warrant, in
common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United
States.
a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders
probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United
States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort
to war cannot be ruled out.
b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger
that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the
determination of the United States to use all the means at its
command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation
of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions
to measures which we might take.
17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether
achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means,
would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United
States.
18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in
the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain
its objectives would be severely weakened by internal developments,
important among which are:
a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by
concerted and well-directed communist activity.
b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.
c. Internal political and social disunity.
d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.
e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of
peace.
f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation
or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct
of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.
g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive
change in Soviet tactics.
19. To counter the threats to our national security and well-being
posed by the USSR, our general objectives with respect to Russia,
in time of peace as well as in time of war, should be:
a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which
no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence
and stability of the world family of nations.
b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international
relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with
the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.
In pursuing these objectives due care must be taken to avoid permanently
impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions
inherent in our way of life.
20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods
short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:
a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian
power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional
Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries
as entities independent of the USSR.
b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes
which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a
revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability
and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.
c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military
influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and
to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature
of the USSR and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and
to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.
d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government
to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis
of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance
with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes
and principles of the UN charter.
21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:
a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained
as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable
support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source
of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression,
and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and
for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.
b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers
of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.
c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening
of our peace-time economy and the establishment of essential reserves
readily available in the event of war.
d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the
non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able
and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security,
to increase their economic and political stability and their military
capability.
e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and
particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite
countries.
f. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats
to our national security so that it will be prepared to support
the measures which we must accordingly adopt.
22. In the event of war with the USSR we should endeavor by successful
military and other operations to create conditions which would
permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S. objectives without
a predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims
supplemental to our peace-time aims should include:
a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the
borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the war.
b. Destroying the structure of relationships by which the leaders
of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral
and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups
of citizens, in countries not under communist control.
c. Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on traditional
Russian territory in the aftermath of war:
(1) Do not have sufficient military power to wage aggressive war.
(2) Impose nothing resembling the present iron curtain over contacts
with the outside world.
d. In addition, if any bolshevik regime is left in any part of
the Soviet Union, insuring that it does not control enough of
the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable
it to wage war on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes
which may exist on traditional Russian territory.
e. Seeking to create postwar conditions which will:
(1) Prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to
the security of the United States and international peace.
(2) Be conducive to the successful development of an effective
world organization based upon the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
(3) Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance within the
United States of wartime controls.
23. In pursuing the above war aims. we should avoid making irrevocable
or premature decisions or commitments respecting border rearrangements,
administration of government within enemy territory, independence
for national minorities, or post-war responsibility for the readjustment
of the inevitable political, economic, and social dislocations
resulting from the war.
© - "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR...", Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 1 (Washington, Government Printing Office, Department of State, 1948), pp. 663-669
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U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet
Threats to U.S. Security ©
NSC 20/4 November 23, 1948
The Problem
Analysis of the Nature of the Threats
Conclusions
THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
U.S. OBJECTIVES AND AIMS VIS-A-VIS THE USSR